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HUMAN LIFE
FEDERALISM
AMENDMENT
I. LEGAL ASPECTS
PROFESSOR LYNN D. WARDLE
It must be remembered that a constitutional amendment is not nec-
essary to achieve all legal and political. change. Some things a constitu-
tional amendment cannot do alone, and other things a constitutional
amendment cannot do well. We know that a constitutional amendment
will not be a panacea, it will be neither a total solution to the "tragedy"
of abortion nor an immediate solution.' For instance, no matter how a
constitutional amendment is phrased, it will be necessary as a practical
matter to enact enforcing legislation.2 So a constitutional amendment is
not the end-all and be-all of the pro-life movement.
There are several critical reasons, however, why a constitutional
amendment like the Hatch amendment' is necessary. These reasons all
have their common source in the Supreme Court decision of Roe v.
Wade.4 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court was considering the constitu-
tionality of the Texas abortion laws, which for nearly 120 years had pro-
hibited all abortions except those done for the purpose of preserving the
life of the mother.8 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, began his
analysis with the declaration that somewhere in the Constitution there is
a fundamerital right of privacy, which "is broad enough to encompass a
See Caron, The Human Life Federalism Amendment-An Assessment, 27 CATH. LAW. 87,
100-11 (1982). The amendment does not directly prohibit abortions. It merely grants Con-
gress and the states the power to restrict or prohibit abortions. Id. at 96-97.
1 Horan, Human Life Federalism Amendment: Its Language, Effects, 62 Hosp. PROGREss,
Dec. 1981, at 12. "Any constitutional amendment needs state and federal legislative support.
This is so because the federal Constitution ... is not a criminal code or a regulatory statute
... [; it) prohibits but does not punish and therefore does not compel." Id.
I S.J. Res. 110, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S10196 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1981).
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
I Id. at 117-19.
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woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."6 This right
of abortion privacy, the Court said, was a fundamental right.7
As you know, that is a very critical label, because that means that the
right is entitled to special protection, the protection of strict judicial scru-
tiny.8 Laws which unduly burden or infringe upon a fundamental right,
like the right to abortion, can only be sustained if necessary to effectuate
a compelling state interest.9 So the determination that the right to abor-
tion, or the right of abortion privacy, was a fundamental right effectively
dictated the outcome of the constitutional analysis at the outset.
The Court observed, of course, that the Texas abortion laws did
clearly infringe upon this right to abortion.10 So then the Court searched
for a compelling state interest. It considered and rejected three potential
justifications. First, it rejected the argument that Texas has a compelling
interest to protect the "right" to life of unborn persons, because the
Court found that the unborn are not persons in the constitutional sense,
and, therefore, they have no right to life."1 Second, the Court rejected the
argument that maternal health constitutes a compelling interest for gen-
eral abortion restrictions." The Court found that mortality in abortions
performed in early pregnancy may be less than mortality in childbirth,
and, therefore, maternal health could not be a compelling interest." Fi-
nally, the Court rejected the argument that protecting the "potential life"
of unborn children-whether they are persons or not-would be a com-
pelling state interest because the Court found that there is a wide diver-
gence of thinking about where life begins."' For that reason, this could
not be a compelling state interest."
The decision in Roe v. Wade effectively invalidated, in whole or in
part, abortion laws that were then in effect in a majority of states." Nev-
ertheless, the Court outlined a model of constitutionally permissible abor-
tion regulations in an ABC fashion:
(A) During the first trimester of pregnancy there can be no restric-
I d. at 153.
' See id.
6 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-43 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
0 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
10 410 U.S. at 164.
1 Id. at 158.
,2 Id. at 163.
13 Id.
" Id. at 159-62.
" See id. at 160-62.
' See id. at 118 n.2.
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tion on the abortion decision of the woman and her physician."
(B) During the second trimester of pregnancy the state still may not
restrict the abortion decision of the woman and her physician.'8 In the
interest of maternal health it may, however, adopt, when necessary, nar-
rowly drafted medical regulations. That is, the state can regulate the
place and manner of abortion in the second trimester, if it is necessary to
do so."'
(C) After viability the state can prohibit abortion, except when nec-
essary "in appropriate medical judgment, for preservation of the life or
health of the mother.
20
Depending upon how you define the health of the mother, the excep-
tion can swallow the rule of allowable postviability abortion restriction.
For example, if health of the mother means whenever the woman wants
an abortion, the rule is that even after viability the state can prohibit all
abortions except when a woman wants an abortion. This is the genesis of
the problems for which a constitutional amendment is the only feasible
remedy.
There is no other feasible way to change Roe v. Wade's rule of consti-
tutional law, the rule of abortion on demand.2 ' Because Roe v. Wade pur-
ported to interpret the Constitution, that decision cannot be overturned
by ordinary legislation or by executive decree. 2 Constitutional law is the
supreme law of the land, and the right of abortion privacy, effectively, the
right of abortion on demand, is presently part of the supreme law of the
land. It is constitutional law.
There are only two ways the Supreme Court interpretation of the
Constitution can be overturned or changed. One is by a subsequent Su-
preme Court decision that overrules or modifies the prior decision,"2 and
the second is by adoption of a constitutional amendment by the processes
outlined in Article V.24 Although the first appears preferable, since it
17 Id. at 164.
Is Id.
19 Id.
SO Id. at 164-65.
21 See Caron, supra note 1, at 91.
12 Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed
"Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333, 338-40 (1982).
03 For example, during the 1940's the Supreme Court overruled or modified its earlier lib-
erty of contract decisions. See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941) (upholding
state statute fixing fees chargeable by a private employment agency); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941) (making it an unfair labor practice for employers to dis-
courage membership in any labor union); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1940)
(it is within the legislative power to fix wages and hours for men as well as women).
, See U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V of the Constitution provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-.
pose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
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would involve much less effort on the part of the pro-life movement, it is
not really feasible for a number of reasons.
First, courts are generally reluctant to overturn judicial precedent.
This is especially true when that precedent is well established and sup-
plemented by numerous cases. In the 10 years since Roe v. Wade, there
have been approximately 250 reported federal court decisions applying
Roe v. Wade to other abortion regulations2 5 There have also been about a
dozen Supreme Court decisions.2 ' The Roe v. Wade precedent is well es-
tablished and supplemented by a great body of case law.
Second, it is unrealistic to expect the Court to overrule the decision
when it has shown absolutely no inclination to do so. In fact, rather than
limiting the doctrine announced in Roe v. Wade or cautiously expanding
it, in decisions such as Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,27 Colautti v.
Franklin, 2 and Bellotti v. Baird,2 9 the Supreme Court has radically ex-
panded the doctrine to provocative and incredible extremes. It is simply
unrealistic to expect an about-face under these circumstances.
Third, the controversy regarding the abortion privacy doctrine, and
abortion itself, renders the Court reluctant to change. The courts are very
jealous of their independence, and would be loath to reverse or modify a
doctrine under circumstances that would create the impression of being
influenced by popular will.
Fourth, it is simply unrealistic to expect a majority of the Justices of
the Supreme Court to vote in accordance with the pro-life movement. For
this to happen, pro-life justices would have to be appointed, and given
the recent experience with Justice O'Connor, who was appointed over the
strenuous objections of some well organized right-to-life groups, it is quite
unlikely, at least for a couple of decades, that such appointments will be
forthcoming.
That leaves only one alternative, the adoption of the constitutional
amendment. A constitutional amendment is necessary to repudiate a rad-
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Con-
stitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or
by Convention in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification
may be proposed by the Congress ....
Id.
11 See, e.g., Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1978); Doe v. Charleston Area
Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 644 (4th Cir. 1975); Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349,
1350-52 (8th Cir. 1974).
26 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,
386 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-70 (1976).
27 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
28 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
29 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT
ical and inhumane legal doctrine that violates the very history and spirit
of constitutional law. Laws requiring parental consent, 30 spousal consent
to abortion,3 viability determination and laws requiring postviability
abortion to be performed by the means least likely to destroy the unborn
"child" have been found unconstitutional. State statutes have prohibited
saline amniocentesis abortions, which are perhaps the most "cruel and
inhumane" way to destroy unborn life, but such statutes have been inval-
idated uniformly by the courts."2 The ironies are incredible.
Furthermore, a constitutional amendment is necessary to return to
the people the right to enact restrictions and prohibitions of abortions
through their elected representatives. The Court stated that there was a
right of abortion privacy protected by the Constitution, but that of course
was a fiction. The word abortion does not appear in the Constitution,
neither does the word privacy. Yet this is the law for no other reason but
that seven members of the Supreme Court said it was, the law. Conse-
quently, many scholars believe that the doctrine of Roe v. Wade should
be overturned for reasons that have little to do with the rightness and
wrongness of abortion.3 3 Roe has been severely criticized as violative of
the constitutional principal of separation of powers.3 4
Seven men, none of whom are elected, can overturn a doctrine so
deeply rooted in the traditions of this country and can resist the persis-
tent efforts of the state legislatures to reestablish protection for those val-
ues and those concerns. In the first 7 years after Roe, state legislatures
enacted 176 different statutes to protect unborn life.35
There is a need to protect the independence and integrity of the fed-
eral judiciary. There is also an urgent need for federal courts to return to
"accepted" standards of professionalism in judicial performance. As a
3o See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407-10 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44
(1979).
SI See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-72 (1976).
" Id. at 75-79.
3 See A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 113 (1976). The major flaw of Roe v.
Wade, according to Cox, is "that the Court failed to establish the legitimacy of the decision
by not articulating a precept of sufficient abstractness to lift the ruling above the level of a
political judgment based upon the evidence currently available from the medical, physical
and social sciences." Id.
' See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 948
(1973). Professor John Ely, one of the most incisive of Roe's critics, concludes that Roe was
not supported by the language of the Constitution. Id. at 935-36. He also states that Roe
was not only incorrectly decided, but was an illegitimate mode of judicial inquiry. Id. at 948-
49; see Estreicher, supra note 22, at 337 & n.5.
31 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 5-5, 6-1, 7-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983) (with-
drawing medical assistance funding for all abortions except those necessary for preservation
of the mother's life); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1981) (an abortion, except to preserve the
life of the mother, is manslaughter).
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landmark decision, Roe v. Wade set an example for the federal courts to
follow. The opinion is an embarrassment to the legal profession, and the
writings and abortion decisions since then have followed the Roe example.
Finally, a constitutional amendment is necessary to stop the killing.
Abortion is rapidly becoming another ho-hum method of birth control.
The Human Life Amendment is the only viable solution.
